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Making the Constable Culpable: A Proposal
To Improve the Exclusionary Rule
By ALYS RAE BOKER* and CAROL A. CORPJGAN**

TWENTY years ago California adopted the exclusionary rule' originally
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United

States.2 Since then California appellate courts have delivered over six
hundred decisions 3 adjudicating whether particular police conduct was

reasonable under the circumstances. Some commentators feel that this
cornucopia of cases has helped clarify the boundaries of acceptable
police conduct; others view the cases as a morass of conflicting opinion

generated by courts trying to apply a nebulous standard to highly
particular fact situations.4 Whatever one's view, however, it is becoming
increasingly clear that the exclusionary rule has been only marginally
successful in achieving its goal of curbing improper police conduct. We
do not intend to review all that has been written about the rule; this
analysis has been ably presented elsewhere. 5 Nor will this article offer a
lengthy debate on the merits and failings of the rule. 6 What follows,
* B.A., 1954, University of Texas; LL.B., J.D., 1966, Golden Gate Law School.
Senior Trial Deputy, Alameda County District Attorney's Office; member, California
Bar. Ms. Boker's primary responsibility is the argument of superior court suppression
motions.
**
B.A., 1970, Holy Names College; J.D., 1975, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Deputy, Alameda County District Attorney's Office; member,
California Bar.
1. See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
2. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3. See A. BELL, JR., BE.L's SEARcHEs, SEizunF-s & BUGING CowENDiuM (1974).
4. See note 6 infra.
5. See, e.g., Comment, Trends in Legal Commentary on the Exclusionary Rule,
65 J. CiUm. L.C. &P.S. 373 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Exclusionary Rule].
6. Compare Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 11 (1925); Hall, Police and Law in a
Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133 (1953); Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual
Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. CRIM. LC. & P.S. 171 (1962); LaFave,
Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part I: Current Police
and Local CourtPractices, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391 (1965); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large
in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE IJ. 319, with Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?,
[12911
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instead, is a brief consideration of the drawbacks of the suppression
doctrine as it operates in California courts today and suggested modifications designed to increase its efficacy and reduce its dysfunctions.
The Rule and Its Drawbacks
The seminal cases establishing the exclusionary rule all involve
flagrant police misconduct.7 It is not difficult to accept the courts' view
that, in a free society, the law cannot allow agents of the state to break
into homes or to abuse suspects physically. In the context of blatant
and intentional police misconduct, the exclusionary rule does not let the
criminal go free "because the constable blundered."" Rather, it operates to preclude judicial sanction of a constable's patently illegal behavior. Yet the great debate over the suppression doctrine continues to
rage, in part because both sides have failed to distinguish between such
reprehensible activity on one hand and honest police error or misjudgment on the other.
In developing the exclusionary rule the courts have proceeded on a
case by case basis, scrutinizing each fact situation and determining
whether, under all the circumstances, specific conduct was reasonable.'
Having analyzed the facts with surgical precision, however, the courts
attempt to cure all deficiencies with the same panacea-suppression of
the evidence. As will be developed below, the time has come for a
refinement of available remedies to provide a more balanced approach
to the problem than that presented by the overly simplistic exclusionary
rule. One should note briefly at the outset, however, that in addition to
the infirmity associated with its overly broad application, the rule itself
suffers from a shaky analytical foundation. Both the United States'"
14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Burger]; Peterson, Law and Police
Practice: Restrictions in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 46 (1957);
Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 MICH. L. REV. 169 (1955); Wingo, Growing
Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Wingo].
7. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (warrantless forced entry over
objection of resident); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (recovery of swallowed drugs by induced vomiting); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)

(breaking and entering into home followed by warrantless search and indiscriminate
seizure of personal belongings); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955)

(numerous forced entries, buggings, and warrantless seizures).
8.

People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).

9.

See People v. Wilson, 145 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 301 P.2d 974, 977 (1956).

10.

"The purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the

constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive
to disregard it.'"

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961), quoting Elkins v. United

States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
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and the California1 1 supreme courts based their acceptance of the
exclusionary rule on the assumptions that it would deter improper police
conduct and that it was the only effective means of doing so. While the
courts found these arguments theoretically compelling, the experience of
twenty years in this state and of over half a century in the federal system
shows that in reality the -rulehas not worked as expected.
The early opinion writers and commentators supported their assertions concerning deterrence with theories rather than empirical data. 2 A
more factual approach was taken in 1970 when Professor Dallin Oaks
published the results of a comprehensive study of the rule's effectiveness. 13 The study represented the "largest fund of information yet
assembled on the effect of the exclusionary rule,"' 4 and the author's
conclusions cast serious doubt on the theoretical underpinnings of the
suppression doctrine.' 5 Oaks wrote that the data were not statistically
dispositive, but based on his review of the evidence he argued as
follows:
As a device for directly deterring illegal searches and seizures by
the police, the exclusionary rule is a failure. There is no reason to
expect the rule to have any direct effect on the overwhelming majority of police conduct that is not meant to result in prosecutions,
and there is hardly any evidence that the rule exerts any deterrent
effect on the small fraction of law enforcement activity that is aimed
at prosection. What is known about the deterrent effect of sanctions suggests that the exclusionary rule operates under conditions
that are extremely unfavorable for deterring the police. The
harshest criticism of the rule is that it is ineffective. It is the sole
means of enforcing the essential guarantees of freedom from unreasonable arrests and searches and seizures by law enforcement
officers, and it is a failure in that vital task.' 6
A later comprehensive study undertaken by James E. Spiotto affirmed
11. "We have been compelled to reach that conclusion because other remedies have
completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of
the police officers ... ." People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911
(1955). "Granted that the adoption of the exclusionary rule will not prevent all illegal
searches and seizures, it will discourage them. Police officers and prosecuting officials
are primarily interested in convicting criminals. Given the exclusionary rule and a
choice between securing evidence by legal rather than illegal means, officers win be
impelled to obey the law themselves since not to do so will jeopardize their objectives."
Id. at 448, 282 P.2d at 913. See also Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty
States, 1962 DuK L.J. 319.
12. See, e.g., Exclusionary Rule, supra note 5, at 376-84.
13. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L.
REv. 665 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Oaks].
14. Id. at 709.
15. See Exclusionary Rule, supra note 5, at 382-83.
16. Oaks, supra note 13, at 755.
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Oaks's conclusion that the rule failed to deter police misconduct effec17
tively.
Why has a rule so logically developed by some of the country's
leading jurists failed? The reasons are twofold. First, the courts
presuppose a closer link than actually exists between on-the-street police
conduct and courtroom procedure. Second, they have tried to deal too
facilely with an extremely complex problem.
An Ineffective Deterrent
In People v. Cahan18 Chief Justice Traynor wrote that "[p]olice
officers . . . are primarily interested in convicting criminals."' 19 This
observation is not precisely accurate. Police officers are primarily
interested in apprehending criminals,20 which is quite another matter.
The officer observes or receives a report of criminal behavior and takes
action to arrest those apparently responsible. Once this objective is
accomplished, he moves on to new investigations.
The average time between arrest and disposition of a suppression
motion is 131.21 days. 2 ' Thus, an officer can receive no feedback on
the propriety of his behavior for nearly four and one-half months.22 In
actuality, he seldom learns of the outcome of the hearing.23 He comes
into court, testifies as to what he did, and leaves the attorneys and judge
to worry about the legal ramifications of his behavior. He suffers no
disciplinary action if the evidence is suppressed, 24 and rather than
experiencing pressure from his peers and superiors, he receives support
17.

See Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule

and Its Alternatives, 2 J.

LEGAL STUDIES

243 (1973).

18.

44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).

19.

Id. at 448, 282 P.2d at 913.

20. See LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary RulePart I: Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391 (1965); Oaks,

supra note 13, at 720-24; Wingo, supra note 6, at 576-77.
21. This figure is based on a computer analysis of all hearings on suppression of
evidence conducted under section 1538.5 of the California Penal Code in the Alameda

County Superior Court from January 1974 to November 1975 (on file in the Alameda
County, California, District Attorney's Office).
22. It should also be noted that this lag refers only to the period between arrest
and superior court ruling on the issue. If either side elects to appeal the superior court

decision, it may be years before this question is finally resolved.
23.

See Burger, supra note 6, at 12.

24. "[D]iligent inquiry has failed to reveal a single law enforcement agency where
individual sanctions are timed to an application of the exclusionary rule. The rule is
apparently expected to achieve its purpose without them."

See also, id. at 725-26; Burger, supra note 6, at 11.

Oaks, supra note 13, at 710.
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25
and sympathy for having a good arrest thrown out on a technicality.
As the system currently operates, those who violate the search and
seizure laws are not punished or even held personally culpable. Instead,
prosecutors are denied the opportunity to enforce laws, and ultimately
citizens are denied the protection those laws are designed to ensure. As
Professor Oaks observed:
[T]he exclusionary rule is well tailored to deter the prosecutor from
illegal conduct. But the prosecutor is not the guilty party in an
illegal arrest or search and seizure, and he rarely
has any measure of control over the police who are responsible. 2 6

The Failings of the Single Solution Approach
In addition to these difficulties of operation, the rule itself is not
sufficiently refined to meet the complex problems presented by search
and seizure cases.
If all suppression motions involved instances of
flagrant police brutality or trespass, the issue would be straightforward
and the solutions could be equally uncomplicated. Fortunately, the vast
majority of cases argued today do not involve the blatant misconduct
which prompted adoption of the rule.2 7 This fact indicates that the rule
has successfully deterred flagrant misconduct and that, as an ultimate
penalty, it will continue to do so. The exclusionary rule, however, does
not reflect recognition of the fact that the majority of situations involve a
police officer who, in the confusion and danger of the moment, must
instantly decide whether he can look into a car, pat down a suspect, or
serve a warrant. The officer who must make his decisions under
pressure has neither the time nor the training to engage in a sophisticated legal analysis. 28
25. Jerome Skolnick spent fifteen months in 1962 and 1963 conducting participatory observation studies of an unnamed police force in a city of 400,000. His conclusions
indicate that police officers are far more influenced by the norms of their departments
than by court decisions, that they are far more concerned with following police rules
than with conforming to court standards, and that they will not be sanctioned for
behavior resulting in evidentiary suppression as long as their actions are consistent with

internal regulations. See J.

SKOLNICK, JusncE WrrHOuT TRiAL: LAw ENFORCEM:ENT IN

DEMOCRATIC SOCmY (1966).

26. Oaks, supra note 13, at 926, citing Katz, Supreme Court and the State: An
Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina, 45 N.C.L. REV. 119, 141 (1966). See
also Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 225, 257 (1961); Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 169, 194

(1955).
27. See B. MATIRN, COMpHENSI-E CALIFoRN A SEARCH & SEmE 3 (Supp.
1972).
28. See Burger, supra note 6, at 11; Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of
CriminalProcedure,53 CAixF. L. REv. 92% 952 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Friendly].
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One writer describes the situation in terms of an inverted pyramid. 29 The ultimate question is whether, given the totality of the
circumstances, the officer acted reasonably. At the broadest part of the
structure is the supreme court, which has months to analyze the problem, and after their examination the justices, as reasonable men, may
differ in their conclusions. Before the case ever reaches them, the court
of appeal will have considered it for weeks or months. Before appeal,
prosecution and defense attorneys will have spent days or weeks marshaling their arguments for magistrates and superior court judges. In the
course of this process of scrutiny, each reviewer looks with calm contemplation over the shoulder of the officer in the field who, at the point of
the pyramid, is expected to reach the right decision instantly.
The mere fact that an officer's job is difficult does not excuse him
from doing it properly, and as an agent of a free society, he must operate
within the constitutional parameters which that society provides. The
exclusionary rule is one means to ensure compliance, but as a tool it is
not sufficiently sensitive to treat different kinds of police misconduct or
mistake appropriately. The exclusionary rule is based on the same
principle as any criminal statute;3" by its operation society attempts to
deter disapproved conduct through the imposition of a penalty.
In Victorian England every felon, from murderer to pickpocket,
was subject to -the same sanction-hanging. In this area our constitutional thinking has evolved, and, while recognizing the deterrent aspect of
punishment, we also require that punishment be proportionate to the
crime for which it is invoked.3 1 If we require this proportionality in the
treatment of those who break the law in one sphere, it is only consistent
to provide for similar proportionality when censuring the unlawful conduct of those attempting to enforce the law.3 2 Furthermore, the substantive criminal law imposes punishment directly upon those responsible for
the transgression. It is the thief who is punished, not the shopkeeper.
Yet, as discussed above,3 3 the sanctions of the suppression doctrine fall
not upon the offending officer but on the prosecution and ultimately
upon the victim of the crime.
29. See 6 POINT OF VIEW 138 (publication of the Alameda County, California,
District Attorney's Office).
30. Friendly, supra note 28, at 951-52. See also Burger, supra note 6, at 11.
31. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972); see
Comment, California's Cruelty Criteria: Evaluating Sentences After In re Lynch, 25
HAsTINGs L.J. 636 (1974).
32. Friendly, supra note 28, at 952.
33. See note 26 & accompanying text supra.
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Toward a More Flexible Solution
The suppression doctrine is offered as a single remedy for a single
problem-improper police conduct resulting in unreasonable search and
seizure. While exclusion is indeed a single solution, the problems it
addresses are multiple. The rule operates not only in cases in which
constitutional protections are cavalierly disregarded, but in a number of
other situations as well. For example, the doctrine comes into play in
each of the following instances.
(1) At 3:00 A.M., a patrolman receives a radio dispatch reporting that a burglary has just occurred. Responding to the scene, he sees
a man walking from the general area and follows 'him into an unlighted
alley. Alone and fearing that the suspect may be armed, the officer
performs a pat search and feels a revolver in the man's pocket. The
man is disarmed, and the weapon is retained by the officer. The gun
will be excluded as evidence unless the patrolman can produce for the
court at the suppression hearing "articulable facts" which made him
fear that the suspect was armed.34
(2) In July, a detective discovers unequivocal evidence of a crime
in a search which is legal under the existing law. The suppression
hearing is conducted in November. In September a new decision is
published which rules police behavior in a similar situation improper.
The November suppression motion will be granted, even though the
officer's actions were perfectly legal when performed. The criminal
will go free because the investigator was unable to look into the future
and prognosticate that two months later an appellate court would
change the law. 5
34. A one-to-one confrontation with an unknown person in a dark and secluded
high crime area would certainly be sufficient to make most people fear for their safety.
Yet these facts alone are not sufficient to allow a perfunctory pat-down. The officer
must be able to testify, for example, that the person had characteristics matching witness
reports of a burglary suspect or that he made'a sudden threatening movement. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30
Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963).
35. An example of definitional change is provided by the development of the
concept of privacy. At one time the Court was concerned with "zones" of privacy or
"constitutionally protected areas." See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965); United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 314 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J.,
dissenting), affd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). Under this formulation there was no search
absent a physical penetration into a protected area. See Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928). In 1967 the Court shifted the emphasis from places to people and
articulated the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. See Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967). Under this new standard, a court could find a search unreasonable
even though no physical intrusion had taken place. Thus, prior to Katz, an officer
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(3) Based upon 'the tip of a reliable informant, an officer requests
that a magistrate issue a search warrant for Smith's house. The affidavit supporting the request states in part: "X, a reliable informant
known to the affiant (officer) to be a former heroin user, told affiant
that Smith is a big heroin dealer. Furthermore, X, stated that Smith
presently has one pound of uncut heroin on the top shelf of his kitchen
cabinet at his residence at 1234 Main Street." The magistrate signs the
warrant that orders the officer to conduct a search. 6 Pursuant to the
court's direction the search is properly performed, and a pound of uncut
heroin is found on the top shelf of the kitchen cabinet. Under the
current case law the evidence could be suppressed. The affidavit should
have said: "X was in Smith's home two days ago and there he saw a
package of heroin in the kitchen."
The magistrate should not have
signed the warrant supported by the conclusional and possibly stale
information given in the first affidavit.3 1
In each of these situations the truth is suppressed not because the
state set out to oppress a suspect, but because a fearful officer made an
error in judgment, or because the law was changed after the fact, or
because a policeman performed as ordered but the direction was illadvised. Chief Justice Burger has called this process "universal 'capital
punishment'" for improperly obtained evidence and compared it to a
"police order authorizing 'shoot to kill with respect to every fugitive."3 "
The chief justice argues further that just as the police must respond to
different situations with appropriate conduct, so should the courts treat
constitutional infringements with "rationally graded responses."39
The Proposal
In keeping with the recommendation of the chief justice, this
conducting an investigation could avoid suppression of evidence by taking care not to
trespass physically on a protected area. Yet if a hearing was held after the decision in

Katz, the evidence could in some cases be suppressed simply because the law had
changed. See generally, Comment, People v. Triggs: A New Concept of Personal
Privacy in Search and 'Seizure Law, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 575 (1974).
36. If the officer fails to carry out an order which is valid on its face he is subject
to contempt proceedings.

Herndon v. County of Marin, 25 Cal. App. 3d 933, 937, 102

Cal. Rptr. 221, 223 (1972); Walton v. Will, 66 Cal. App. 2d 509, 516, 152 P.2d 639, 642
(1944) (Moore, P.J., concurring in pertinent part); Pankewicz v. Jess, 27 Cal. App. 340,
342, 149 P. 997, 998 (1915).
37. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Halpin v. Superior Ct., 6 Cal. 3d

885, 495 P.2d 1295, 101 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1972); People v. Hamilton, 71 Cal. 2d 176,
454 P.2d 681, 77 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1969).
38. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 419 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
39.

Id.
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proposal is offered as a modification of the current system provided for
by Penal Code section 1538.5.40 The above discussion indicates that
the present approach is ineffective because it fails to penalize those
personally responsible for infractions, results in the suppression of truth,
thus placing the actual penalty on the prosecution and the victim, and
does not provide for the selection of an appropriate remedy. One way
to correct these dysfunctions is to bifurcate the present system, allowing
the superior court judge to pass upon the evidentiary issue of admissibility and referring the case to an administrative board for the imposition
of sanctions.
The Superior Court
Under this proposal the superior court judge would hear the evidence at a 1538.5 hearing, just as he does now, and would decide
whether the officers acted lawfully. If he concluded that they did not,
he would then rule on the nature of the police misconduct and certify
the case for administrative hearing on the appropriate penalty to be
imposed.
If the police behavior was flagrantly improper, as in a case of
intentional and unwarranted harm to person or property, the evidence
would be suppressed. A free society has no valid interest in seeing its
citizens subjected to police-state tactics, and evidentiary suppression
prevents the government from profiting by the intentional wrongdoing
of its agents. In addition, those agents should be personally sanctioned.
It is the current absence of such a sanction which is one of the rule's
major failings.
If the misconduct is not blatant,4 1 however, a more moderate
approach is called for. It makes no sense to suppress evidence in such
instances, as this remedy has been shown to be unavailing. Rather, the
evidence should be admitted and those responsible for the police conduct disciplined. In this fashion the legal system could move forward in
the determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence unhobbled by the
suppression doctrine, while the penalty would fall more appropriately
upon those who erred.
The AdministrativeProcedure
The police conduct having been found improper, the case would be
certified to an administrative board. This board and its staff would be
40. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5 (West 1970 & Supp. 1975).
41. See note-s 34-37 & accompanying text supra.
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charged by the legislature with responsibility for imposing administrative sanctions upon officers and magistrates.42 Since sanctions would
be imposed, the system must provide for procedural due process." The
requisite procedure would involve two tiers. Initially a reviewing officer
would evaluate all the documents in the case, including the 1538.5
transcript, the police reports, and any statements offered by the suspect
or witnesses. On the basis of this review the officer would recommend
to the board those sanctions which he considered to be appropriate.
Available penalties would include an order for the police officer's
suspension or dismissal, a fine to be paid by the officer, the department,
or both, an entry of misconduct in the officer's personnel record, and a
fine to be paid by the magistrate who signed a deficient warrant. This
procedure would operate to penalize in a personal way those responsible
for infractions and would ensure feedback from the court system to law
enforcement personnel. Fines would be determined by reference
to a fixed scale and would be sufficiently stringent to act as a
real deterrent. Fining the department as well as the officer would
increase the impetus for training and supervision."
Police personnel
practices would be modified so that an entry of misconduct would affect
an officer's promotion in salary or rank and a certain number of
infractions would result in dismissal. In addition to a system of fines,
an arrangement could be made with the state bar or local judicial
counsel subjecting a magistrate to a penalty similar to that imposed
upon an officer by including an entry of misconduct in his personnel
record.
The hearing officer having made his recommendation, the case
would proceed to the full board. At this stage the officer or magistrate,
represented by counsel, could argue his case and present any additional
documentary or testimonial evidence. After reviewing all the material
before it, the board would order sanctions. If an officer's conduct was
obviously improper, the board would order dismissal or suspension. If
42.

The board should be composed, at least in part, of those with experience in

both the legal and the practical realities of search and seizure problems.

Thus, the panel

should include a former police administrator and a former magistrate. In order to avoid
conflicts of interest, however, these members should not be serving in those capacities
while they are on the board.
43. Cf. Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
44. "After not very many outlays of public funds the taxpayers and administrative
heads would insist upon curbing unlawful police action." Report of CaliforniaState Bar
Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure, 29 CAL. ST. B.J. 263, 264 (1954), quoted in
Wingo, supra note 6, at 581-82. Penalizing the department would be particularly

appropriate if the officer was acting in accordance with a department practice.
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the conduct represented an error in judgment, a fine or personnel entry
would be appropriate. The penalty imposed would be in keeping with
the impropriety of the conduct. In this regard the American Law

Institute has articulated a number of factors to be weighed in assessing
the substantiality of the violation.4 5

Improper search warrants would be treated as follows. If an
officer obtained a warrant by intentionally misleading a magistrate, the
violation would be flagrant per se, and the sanctions discussed above
would be imposed upon the officer. If a warrant was technically
improper because of a mistake by both officer and magistrate, both
would be penalized. If the officer took no part in obtaining the warrant
or if he was not responsible for the warrant's deficiency, the penalty

would fall on the magistrate alone.4
In cases in which violations were not flagrant, the board might be
given the option of suspending the imposition of penalties. In order to

prevent this alternative from providing a loophole which would reduce
the remedy to a sham, however, such an option would be limited. It
would be appropriate in instances in which the law was changed,
making an officer's legal conduct retroactively improper, or in which a
case was appealed and the justices differed in their evaluations of
reasonableness.47
In addition to hearing cases certified by the superior court, the
board would serve as a reviewing panel to deal with infringements
alleged by citizens who were never arrested or brought into the criminal
system but who claimed to have been subjected to improper police
search. The board would thus fill a gap noted by many critics of the
45. The factors given by the ALI are: "(a) the importance of the particular
interest violated; (b) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct; (c)the extent to
which the violation was willful; (d)the extent to which privacy was invaded; (e)the
extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of this Code; (f) whether, but
for the violation, the things seized would have been discovered; and (g) the extent to
which the violation prejudiced the moving party's ability to support his motion, or to
defend himself in the proceeding in which the things seized are sought to be offered in
evidence against him." MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRPAGNMENT PROCEDURE § 8.02(2)
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1971). To this list the authors would add as a factor the extent to
which the officer's conduct reflected a moderate attempt to ensure his safety which he, in
good faith, felt to be threatened.
46. To do otherwise would be unjust to the officer. The signed search warrant
constitutes a court order directing him to act; failure or refusal to do so subjects him to
citation for contempt. See note 36 supra.
47. It seems inequitable to censure a police officer for conduct if appellate justices
cannot agree on the reasonableness of his behavior.
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exclusionary rule, that it protects criminals but affords no remedy to the
48
innocent.
Appeal
There would be two distinct points at which an appeal could be
undertaken. After the superior court hearing on the propriety of the
search, either defense or prosecution could contest the judge's legal
findings at the court of appeal level, just as they can under the present
system.
In addition, the legislation establishing this new procedure
would give the officer or magistrate special standing to challenge the
superior court's ruling. The extension of such standing would be
required, since the officer or magistrate is not properly a party to the
1538.5 hearing. Such an appeal would suspend any board action until
the legal issue was resolved. If the decision was reversed and the search
found to be lawful, no further board action would be necessary, since
the board would only hear cases of alleged police misconduct.
If the board did act, however, an officer or magistrate wishing to
appeal its decision would proceed by way of a writ of mandate to the
superior court. The writ would request court review of the record of
the board's proceedings and a ruling on the sufficiency of the record to
support the board's action. The granting of the writ would be discretionary, but the exercise of that discretion, as well as any subsequent
court ruling, would be reviewable through the standard procedure.
Feasibility of the Proposal
We recognize that this proposal will not be enthusiastically received
in many quarters. Its implementation would result in the creation of a
new administrative board which would require a substantial outlay of
public funds for its operation, and many people will object to this
expense.
The present system, however, is no less costly. Great
amounts of police and court time are spent on cases which never come
to judgment because evidence is suppressed. Perhaps more important,
society pays dearly in the coin of public respect and confidence in the
judicial system. Police officers and magistrates who would be subjected
to penalties will object that the sanctions would further inhibit law
enforcement. Each of these objections has some merit, but on balance
each must yield to the need for a more effective remedy than that
currently provided by the exclusionary rule.
48.
at 576.

See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Wingo, supra note 6,
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If the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to
mean anything, it must be effectively protected by the legal system. That
protection is not now afforded by the suppression doctrine. What we
have currently is an inefficient tool which too often punishes those not
responsible, allows the guilty to avoid prosecution, and generally fosters
frustration and diminished respect for the legal structure among the
citizenry, including members of the bench and bar. What isneeded is a
more sensitive tool which will balance the suspect's right to freedom
from unreasonable searches and citizens' right to effective law enforcement.
The courts have stated repeatedly that they will not dispose of the
exclusionary rule in the absence of an alternative.4 9 The option offered
here may be cumbersome and costly, but we can no longer pay the price
which the suppression doctrine exacts. If this alternative is unworkable, then another must be found. As Chief Justice Burger has written:
Instead of continuing to enforce the suppression doctrine inflexibility, rigidly, and mechanically, we should view it as one of the
experimental steps in the great tradition of the common law and
acknowledge its shortcomings. But in the same spirit we should
be prepared to discontinue what the experience of over half a
century has shown neither deters errant officers nor affords a
remedy to the totally innocent victims of official misconduct. 50
49. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422 (1971) (Burger,
C.l, dissenting).
50. Id. at 420.

